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ABSTRACT 
The rapid increase in the adoption rate of cloud computing, across numerous 
businesses, has resulted in extensive use of virtualization tools. Virtualization technology 
utilizes a software layer (hypervisor) to enable sharing of hardware between multiple 
tenants that are co-located on the same multi-processor system. This enables the 
consolidation of servers and user machines into a very small set of physical systems. 
Physical machines are replaced with virtual machines (VM), running on the same 
physical system, to achieve better utilization of the hardware. Consequently, cloud users 
work on and store their data in the same physical machine. 
A crucial part of a cloud setup is preventing information leakage between tenants. 
While the hypervisor enforces software isolation, shared CPU, cache or memory, has the 
potential to leak sensitive information [4]. This article aims to provide an overview of 
the security concerns in virtualization technology, particularly in relation to row hammer
bug
 
that affects the DRAM chips.  
As DRAM process technology scales down in dimension, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to prevent sub-micron electrical interaction between DRAM cells. This leads to 
unintentional effects where, activating the same row or same set of rows in DRAM (row 
hammer) corrupts data in nearby rows. If row hammer is coupled with some resource 
sharing features that can be enabled in hypervisors, then there is a high likelihood of 
corrupting a piece of data that belongs to another VM. This article is a survey of   some 
prior works
 
in
 
cloud-based row hammer attacks [6][7] and sheds some light on the 
exploit
 
mechanics.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The push towards low-cost, high-performance computing results in an increase in 
hardware and software complexity. The semiconductor industry packs more and more 
transistors into chips which makes them denser and the components on the chip are getting 
closer to each other with time. Modern operating systems are loaded with features to support 
efficient resource management in performance sensitive settings such as the cloud. 
The outcomes of the above-mentioned trends include reduced reliability and security. 
Hardware components are increasingly prone to failures. Smaller cells store smaller charge, 
resulting in smaller noise margin. As a direct result of this, a significant fraction of the 
DRAM chips produced in recent years (since 2012) are prone to unintended bit flips. 
Software features such as memory deduplication serve as side channels for attackers. 
This paper explores attack methodologies to breach the software isolation (enforced 
by the hypervisor) between tenants on a multi-tenant setup. The rest of this report is 
organized as follows. Chapter 2 talks about some background information about memory 
hierarchy and DRAM organization, the understanding of which plays a critical role in 
understanding row hammer bug. Chapter 3 goes on to summarize the row hammer attack, 
related work and attack methodologies that could result in an increased probability for bit flip 
observation in a physical DRAM, using DRAM mapping functions. Chapter 4 gets into the 
details of cloud computing and data deduplication feature present in most popular cloud 
vendors including Xen, KVM, VMware ESXi. Finally, chapter 5 talks about how this sharing 
feature could be leveraged to corrupt the data that belongs to another VM (isolation breach). 
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CHAPTER 2: MEMORY ORGANIZATION 
2.1 Memory lookup 
Modern operating systems allow programs to work with seemingly contiguous 
memory space known as the virtual memory. When a program needs access to some data, the 
CPU requests for that particular virtual address where the data is assumed to be stored by the 
OS. The virtual address is then translated to a physical address, which is an actual location on 
the memory. 
A data structure, known as page table, holds the translation between virtual page 
address and physical frame address. These mappings are stored as entries in the page table 
for each program. This means that if a program wants to access some virtual address then the 
page table for that program is searched to retrieve the mapping.  
Frequently accessed addresses are cached in translation lookaside buffer (TLB), 
which acts as a cache for page table entries (PTE). If the mapping is not present in TLB then 
the page table is searched and if its absent in the page table then it is loaded from the disk, 
following which the PTE and TLB are updated. Figure 2.1 describes this process. 
 
Figure 2.1 Memory access hierarchy  
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2.2 DRAM organization 
DRAM chips are large arrays of memory cells with additional logic for data access 
(read/write) and refresh circuitry for maintaining data integrity. Memory systems are 
organized into multiple memory channels, each operated by its own dedicated memory 
controller. Each channel is divided into ranks (sides of the ram stick), which consist of 
several DRAM chips that work together to handle misses or refill requests from the 
processor’s last-level cache. Each rank is partitioned into multiple banks. Every bank has a 
dedicated cache (row buffer) to store the last accessed row in that bank. Ranks and banks 
support independent transactions which allows parallel accesses to the DRAM chips. Figure 
2.2 (a) captures the memory hierarchy described in the paragraph. 
Memory arrays are organized in rows (word-lines) and columns (bit-lines) of memory 
cells. Memory cells consist of a capacitors that can be charged and discharged to store a 0 or 
a 1. An access transistor in each cell allows reads and writes to its content. The transistor is 
controlled through the word-line. When the word-line is activated, the content of all the 
capacitors on that row are discharged to the bit-lines. Sense amplifier circuitry on each bit-
line amplifies the signal and stores the result in the row buffer. Additional circuitry in the 
memory arrays includes address decoding logic to select rows and columns and internal 
counters to keep track of refresh cycles. Figure 2.2 (b) shows the word-lines, the bit-lines and 
the sense amplifiers described in the paragraph. 
 
 
 
8 
 
(a) Memory System Hierarchy 
 
 
(b) DRAM bank structure 
 
 
(c) DRAM row structure 
 
 
(d) Memory hierarchy with multiple channels and DIMMs (Module) 
 
Figure 2.2  DRAM system organization 
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CHAPTER 3: ROW HAMMER 
 
3.1 Row hammer Mechanics 
 
Row hammer, as an attack vector, targets the design vulnerabilities present in modern 
dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips. As DRAM memory cell density increases, 
electrical interaction between neighboring cells also increases, causing leakage of capacitor 
charges at an accelerated pace and, potentially, data loss.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, DRAM chips consist of rows of cells. These 
cells are periodically refreshed to maintain the charge stored in each cell. When the CPU 
requests a read/write operation on a particular memory location, memory controller transfers 
the data to the row-buffer (discharge). After performing the requested operation, memory 
controller copies the contents of the row-buffer back to the row (recharge). The normal read 
cycle has been depicted in Figure 3.1. Under normal circumstances, such read and write 
operations do affect the charge stored in the adjacent rows. This can be ensured by making 
use of clever schemes for virtual to physical memory mapping, to prevent successive 
accesses to the rows in the same bank (bank thrashing). 
 
Figure 3.1 Normal read operation 
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Frequent discharge-recharge cycle, known as row hammer, can cause errors that are 
reflected by an accelerated discharge rate on adjacent row’s cells. If the adjacent rows 
(victim rows) are not refreshed before losing their charge, the acceleration in discharge rate 
can introduce unintentional bit-flips. Figure 3.2 explains the exploit visually.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Row hammer Mechanics 
 
3.2 Cache eviction 
 
 One of the fundamental requirements of row hammer is that the repeated reads should 
happen from the DRAM. In a modern architecture, recently used data is cached. It means that 
for subsequent operations, the data is fetched from cache rather than the DRAM. Prior work 
[1][4] make use of the following cache eviction strategies: 
• clflush 
• cache eviction by cache set filling 
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clflush instruction is provided by intel for cache maintenance and can be used to remove 
data from cache. clflush instructions, inserted after every read can ensure that the subsequent 
data accesses always go to DRAM. But clflush is as much a cache attack as a DRAM attack 
[4]. Also, clflush is language dependent. For example, it is not available in JavaScript, for 
web-based attacks.  
Another technique of removing data from cache is to fill up the cache set with random 
data until the target data has been evicted [4]. In any memory architecture, various DRAM 
addresses map to the same cache set. Each cache set has ways, typically 8. Once the data 
belonging to a particular memory address has been placed in one of the ways, the other 
remaining ways are used for future accesses involving memory addresses that map to the 
same cache set, before evicting the data from the previous memory access. The order of 
eviction depends on the replacement policy used by the CPU.   
 
3.2 Physical memory mapping 
 
 Another condition that will significantly boost the chances of seeing a bit-flip is if the 
memory being accessed belong to different rows but same bank. As discussed earlier, every 
bank has a row buffer. If row was accessed before, the next access to that row would be 
happen from the row buffer rather than the row itself. To identify address pairs that follow 
this condition, clever side channel methods can be used. Figure 3.3 shows the timing 
observed for various pairs. The most favorable address pair condition has been highlighted. If 
the address pairs belong to different banks, the next access latency is low because they are 
cached (row hit). But if the address pairs belong to the same bank (different row), the 
subsequent access latency is going to be high because the address pairs will keep evicting 
each other from the row buffer (row conflict). Using this timing difference along with a brute 
12 
force search can reveal the physical address to physical location mapping (i.e. the exact 
channel, rank, bank details), as shown by gruss et al. [4]. By making use of the mapping 
information, row hammer attacks can be made a more effective and efficient. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Timing information for address mapping 
 
 
Typical address map in consumer grade x86 platform  
If a system has 4 gigabytes of memory, it can be indexed completely using 32 addressing 
bits. Which means that the physical address has to be 32 bits long. The physical address bits 
are further broken down for identifying the exact physical location, as given below: 
column index lower bits (0-5) 
channel number bit (6) 
column index upper bits (7-13) 
bank address bits (bits 14,15,16 XOR’d with lower 3 bits of row index bits) 
rank number (17) 
row index bits (18-32).   
This is for a dual channel, dual rank, 8 bank memory structure. 
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CHAPTER 4: CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
4.1 Virtualization 
 
The concept of virtualization is the foundation upon which modern cloud 
infrastructures thrive. Virtualization is the creation of virtual versions of some real objects 
such as hardware and software. It enables creation of a layer of abstraction to mask the 
complexity of the underlying software or hardware layer. Logical partitions of real objects 
are made, to create instances of virtual objects. An example of this would be the hard disk on 
our computers. Each partition of the hard disk in an operating system is the logical copy of 
original hard disk. An extension of this idea is what is used in cloud computing. Multiple 
logical computers are created on a single physical server.  
Computers of today are underutilized and can be better utilized by running more 
programs. This was the initial push towards cloud computing and the idea evolved to its 
present state where multiple users create their own “computers” on a public cloud. Each one 
of these virtual computers can run different operating systems without interfering with each 
other. This is made possible by a specialized software called hypervisor. The hypervisor is 
responsible for enforcing isolation between the virtual machines (VMs) that coexist on the 
same physical hardware. The hypervisor manages any system calls made by the VMs. 
Hypervisor can be bare metal (type 1), running directly on top of the hardware, or they can 
run on top of a base OS (type 2). Public cloud providers make use of the type 1 hypervisor 
for their performance benefits. Figure 4.1 illustrates these hypervisor types.  
In the recent years, hypervisors have been modified to support features that would 
allow the public cloud providers to maximize profits. These techniques involve resource 
reduction as their common denominator. By doing so, additional logical computers can be 
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realized on the same physical rack, without any additional hardware. One such feature is 
memory deduplication, a feature that is used to reduce memory (DRAM) usage.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Hypervisor types. 
 
4.2 Memory deduplication 
 
Memory deduplication is a memory sharing feature implemented in popular open-
source and commercial hypervisors. The list includes Linux KVM, VMWare ESXi and Xen. 
The idea is that if multiple memory pages have the same content, then the hypervisor could 
maintain one copy for these pages and point the PTEs of those programs to that common 
physical memory location. If one of the shared (deduplicated) pages is modified by any one of 
the VMs that is sharing the page, a copy-on-write (CoW) is issued. In other words, a copy of 
the page made before performing the write operation. The write operation takes effect on the 
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copy that belongs to the VM that issues the write operation. This allows for significant memory 
space savings when there are many identical pages across VMs.  
Although the technique has space saving benefits, it comes with its share of unexpected 
security vulnerabilities. In a virtualized environment where both an attacker and a victim 
virtual machine might be co-hosted, the attacker can gather memory information from the 
victim. Because of an extra copy operation, the access times incurred for performing write 
operation to a deduplicated page and a non-deduplicated page are different. Based on this 
difference in access times, the attacker can determine whether a given page is present in the 
memory of a co-hosted VM by loading the page into its own memory space and waiting until 
the contents are merged into a single memory location. A subsequent write to that page takes 
longer time than a write operation to a normal page. This time difference serves as a side 
channel that reveals the contents of the victim VM, resulting in information leakage. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Kernel same-page merging 
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CHAPTER 5: ROW HAMMER IN MULTI-TENANT CLOUD SETTING 
 
5.1 Address translation in VM: 
 
 On a machine running Linux natively, the virtual to physical address translation is 
available in the /proc/self/pagemap file. In a virtualized setup, the guest OS is provided with 
a pseudo address translation. Which means that the page table available to the guest OS only 
generates a pseudo physical address. These addresses are handled by the hypervisor. The 
hypervisor has a shadow page table which contains the mapping for pseudo address (guest 
physical address) to the actual physical address. Thus, the guest OS does not have access to 
these addresses, which renders the row targeted row hammer attack difficult to mount.  
The translation process described above is slow because of the double page walk. 
Newer para-virtualization technology allows guest OS to store the actual physical addresses 
to speed things up. As a result, targeted row hammer attacks can be mounted in a para-
virtualized setup.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Address translation in VM 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Address translation in Para-Virtualized VM 
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To mount an effective row-hammer attack, selection of aggressor rows belonging to 
the same bank is essential. In order to mount an attack in a para-virtualized setup (no 
shadow page table): 
• Look for bit flips in your VM’s (attacker VM) address space. 
• If found, release the memory and load the target page into that location. 
• Force the victim VM to load the page into its memory. 
• Wait for KSM feature to merge the page into your (attacker) physical address 
and update the PTEs. 
• Hammer the adjacent rows to get a flip. 
• CoW does not work here because row hammer is not a traditional write operation 
(does not go through CPU). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The attack scheme discussed in this paper allows  an attacker to compromise co-
hosted cloud VMs with relatively low effort level. Newer chips from intel and AMD support 
hardware virtualization (intel-VT-x and AMD-V). The translation from guest physical 
address to host physical address is done in the hardware. In this case, a brute force single 
sided row hammer is the alternate attack scheme for a cross VM attack,  which makes it 
 inrelatively effective.  Therefore, it is  essential that the cloud vendors make a switch from 
para-virtualized setup to hardware-virtualized setup in order to    mitigate  the
 
malicious
 effects  of  row  hammer  in  a  public  cloud.  
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